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T he theory of evolution is a remarkable scientific accomplishment. The empirical evidence behind the theory is overwhelming. The fact of evolution, that the present species of organisms have come 
into being over millions of years as a result of gradual 
changes, is difficult, if not impossible, to gainsay. The the­
ory has been confirmed by the combined efforts of scientists 
all over the world. The theory is so well tested that those 
people who criticize it are usually dismissed as Bible­
beating religious fanatics, or as unscientific, ignorant, stu­
pid and insane - maybe even wicked. Harvard biologist Dr. 
Ernst Mayr, an expert on evolution, goes so far as to say 
that those people who do not believe in the truth of evolu­
tion have not received a good education, and the number of 
unbelievers "casts a lot of poor light on American educa­
tion." l Today, a robust and refined version of Darwin's the­
ory of evolution (neo-Darwinism) takes pride of place in 
science and philosophy classrooms in America. On the 
whole, the controversy between science and religion is over 
and done with. Theology is no longer threatened by the 
theory of evolution or scared of science finding out truths 
of the world. 
Nevertheless, the so-called Creation scientists con­
tinue to argue against the theory of evolution. In good Dar­
winian fashion, the Creation scientists have had to craft bet­
ter arguments in order to survive. A new species of Crea­
tionists has appeared-the neo-Creationists (neo-creos). 
They claim that mere evolution is false because there are 
signs of extra-natural (intelligent) forces at play. They argue 
that design exists in nature that is not a product of natural 
processes. What distinguishes the new creationists from the 
old creationists is that they have learned that the only ap­
proach to the question of origins and evolution is the scien­
tific approach. As a result of more than a century of relent­
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less accusations of being unscientific and religious, along 
with failed attempts to push their view in the courtroom, 
the neo-creos have focused their efforts at unseating the 
philosophical. assumptions of science. They admit that the 
fossil and molecular data in particular, and the empirical 
data in general, support the theory of evolution, but they 
do not admit defeat. 
Their new tactic is to turn the tables on the scientific 
method. They claim that they are not practicing pseudo­
science, but rather that it is the Darwinists who are endan­
gering scientific scholarship. The scientific method, they 
claim, must not rule out the possibility detecting further 
reality beyond the causal order of nature. Their main argu­
ment which is not new but has come back with renewed 
vigor - is that the naturalistic interpretation of the Descent 
of Life is not science, but a philosophical worldview. If 
methodological naturalism is expunged from science, as the 
Creationist reasoning goes, then pure scientific light shall 
be free to shine on the world as it is, in all of God's glory. 
In this paper, I shall argue that naturalism is not a 
philosophical bias, but an essential foundation of science. 
The first section of this paper explicates the neo-creo argu­
ment against naturalism. The second section is a defense of 
naturalism against anti- or super-naturalism. The third sec­
tion is a critique of arguments from design. We shall see 
why the approach of the neo-creos is unscientific, and that 
the exclusion of super-naturalism from an explanation of 
origins is warranted and desirable on both philosophical 
and scientific grounds. 
I. NATURALISM AND ITS CREATION CRITICS 
The theory of evolution is usually taken to include 
Darwin and Wallace IS idea of natural selection as the cen­
tral mechanism of evolution. The theory says that all organ­
isms originated from an undirected, natural, law-bound 
process of generation, development, mutation and natural 
selection - what Darwin called "survival of the fittest. II 
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While the details of evolution are complex, a key part of the 
theory is that evolution happens without any purposeful 
input - no Creator, no Intelligent Designer. According to 
Darwin, nature is self-contained; chance and nature deter­
mine everything. 
Few would deny that organisms have changed over 
time. The Creationist case against naturalistic evolution is 
almost exclusively focused on arguing that the theory of 
evolution is on its own terms a failure. Neo-Creationists op­
pose the theory that lithe full panoply of life has evolved 
through purposeless naturalistic processes. 1I2 The neo-creos 
point to many mysteries of biology, like the unknown ori­
gin of life, sexuality and the genetic code, to argue against 
the theory of evolution. However, the argument I am pri­
marily interested in for the present purposes is the argu­
ment attributed to professor of law and father of neo­
Creationism, Phillip E. Johnson, 'who says that Darwinism 
is not so much a scientific theory, but a philosophical enter­
prise whose goal is to explain the world in a strictly natu­
ralistic way that forecloses any role for a Creator or Intelli­
gent Designer. Johnson has made his name by arguing that 
what has been sold to us in the authoritative name of sci­
ence is actually a philosophical understanding of reality. As 
long as we take the fWldam.ental assumption of Darwinism 
for granted - that naturalistic processes can explain every­
thing - Darwinism, he claims, becomes an absolute theory, 
seen as necessarily true, because the alternative, Intelligent 
Design, is automatically vetoed. Therefore, in Johnson's 
words, 'The first step for a twenty-first century science of 
origins is to separate materialist philosophy from empirical 
science. 1I3 This means that at the end of the day, scientists 
are supposed to come back from the field and look at what 
the evidence shows without a materialist bias and ask if 
natural forces explain what they see. For example, an an.., 
thropologist is supposed to ask herself: 
Does the fossil record fit when you look at it objec­
tively and without a Darwinian bias? We know the 
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answer to that is no. We ask, 'Does finch beak 
variation really show how you can get finches in 
the first place?" No, of course not. Neo-Darwinism 
is a failed project - give it up! "Not yet!" you say. 
"We're still trying to succeed."4 
The anatomy of the problem, according to the neD-creos is, 
in short, that empirical science has become confused and 
cmlflated with materialist or naturalist philosophy, creating 
a conflict of interest. Evolutionary scientists, Johnson ar­
gues, have an obligation lito separate materialist philosophy 
from scientific investigation"5 and to accept what biologists 
know as biologists and what archeologists know as arche­
ologists, but not their claims about philosophical issues like 
naturalism. Johnson appeals to the tide of history by point­
ing out that lIone by one the great prophets of materialism 
have been shown to be false prophets and have fallen aside. 
Marx and Freud have lost their scientific standing. Now 
Darwin is on the block."6 
Johnson'S argument was evidently so convincing, 
that historian and philosopher Michael Ruse - the philoso­
pher who in 1981 testified in an Arkansas courtroon1 that 
creation science has none of the essential features of science 
and is actually dogmatic religious fundmnentalism ­
changed his opinion on the matter after being asked to 
comment on Johnson1s book Darwin on Trial. Ruse, speak­
ing at a 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science, said: 
Alld it seems to me very clear that at some very ba­
sic level, evolution as a scientific theory makes a 
commitment to a kind of naturalism, namely, that 
.at some level one is going to exclude miracles and 
these sorts of things, come what may. Now, you 
might say, does this mean it's just a religious as­
sumption, does this mean it's irrational to do some­
thing like this. I would argue very strongly that it's 
not. At a certain pragmatic level, the proof of the 
pudding is in the eating. And that if certain things 
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do work, you keep going with this, and that you 
donlt change in midstream, and so on and so forth. 
I think that one can in fact defend a scientific and 
naturalistic approach, even if one recognizes that 
this does include a metaphysical assumption to the 
regularity of nature, or something of this nature ... 
evolution, akin to religion, involves making certain a 
priori or metaphysical assumptions, which at some level 
cannot be proven empirically? 
In these words, Ruse is confessing that he has recently come 
to realize that the theory of evolution is based on unproven 
philosophical assumptions. Assuring the audience that he 
is "no less of an evolutionist now than I ever was,l! Ruse 
went on to say that "an evolutionist, is metaphysically 
based at some level, just as much as ... some creationist .. .! 
must say that live been coming to this kind of position my­
self."B Ruse in the early 1980s was of the clear-cut opinion 
that evolutionism is science and creationism is not. "Now," 
he says, "I'm starting to feeL .. that we should move our de­
bate now onto another level. .. l think that we should recog­
nize, both historically and perhaps philosophically, cel'-. 
tainly that the science side has certain metaphysical as­
sumptions built into doing science ... 119 
It obvious that Johl1son
'
s interest in framing the 
problem in terms of naturalism versus empirical science 
leaves the door open to the possibility of scientific evidence 
for design by refuting the naturalist worldview and its con­
sequences. The logic of this strategy is to agree with the 
evolutionists that science, not philosophy or theology, is the 
only way to detect intelligent design and intelligent causes, 
and then to claim that the only epistemically acceptable sci­
ence is that which is unencumbered by naturalistic philoso­
phy. An acceptable science, suggests creationist William 
Dembski, is one that rejects "methodological naturalism."IO 
This type of call to weed the naturalistic philosophical bias 
(methodological naturalism) out of the biological sciences is 
not new. Creationist Duane T. Gish in 1973 says that he: 
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Strongly suspects that the dogmatic acceptance of 
evolution is not due, primarily, to the nature of the 
evidence but the philosophic bias peculiar to our 
times .... That this is the philosophy held by most 
biologists has been recently emphasized by 
Dobzhansky. In his review of Monod's book Chance 
and Necessity Dobzhansky (1972) says, IlHe has 
stated with admirable clarity, and eloquence often 
verging on pathos, the mechanistic materialist phi­
losophy shared by most of the present 
'establishment' in the biological sciences)1 
In sum, neo-Creationists believe that many aspects 
of life are too complex to be explained except by reference 
to an intelligent designer, God. They say that scientists have 
overlooked evidence of design in nature because of a natu­
ralist philosophical bias. Supporters of this view argue that 
evolutionary science is thus more metaphysical than an em­
pirical undertaking, because naturalists are necessarily evo­
lutionists and therefore not open to other explanations. In 
the follownlg sections, we shall see that this is not entn'ely 
true. Science does rely on methodological naturalism the 
study of matter, energy, and their interaction - in seeking 
logical explanations and empirical evidence for natural 
phenomena. However, the theory of evolution is not merely 
a philosophical worldview. Nor does it have an opinion on 
the intervention of supernatural powers in the natural 
world, except that there is no testable way to use this as an 
operative explanation. 
II. TAKING NATURALISM SERIOUSLY 
Framing the problem as one between philosophy 
and science is at best playing cat and mouse with the issue, 
and at worst unproductive, because it relies on a mistaken 
division. Taking science out of empirical philosophy is ob­
viously a bad idea. In the words of John Dewey, "For ac­
cording to empirical philosophy, science provides the only 
means we have for learning about man and. the world in 
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which he lives.1I12 EmpiTical materialist philosophy has no 
quarrel with science, and neither do the nea-creos. What 
they want to do is take the philosophy out of empirical evo­
lutionary science to arrive at a science that is free from pre­
supposition, or at least those presuppositions that they do 
not like. They have supposed that since science is supreme 
in the field of knowledge, philosophy is therefore unneces­
sary and should not contaminate science. 
First, I must say that these comments lack any in­
sight into the nature of science. In the words of Max Weber 
in an essay titled "Science as a Vocation/ "No science is ab­
solutely free from presuppositions, and no science can 
prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these 
presuppositions. lIl3 For instance, he notes that "All scien­
tific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method 
are valid.1!14 In addition, all scientific work also presupposes 
naturalism, conceived as the absence of supernatural inter­
vention. Ronald N. Giere defines naturalism as follows: 
Ontologically, naturalism hnplies the rejection of 
supernaturalism. Traditionally this has meant pri~ 
madly the rejection of any deity, such as the Jlldco~ 
Christian God, which stands outside nature as crea~ 
tor or actor. Positively, naturalists hold that reality, 
including human life and society, is exhausted by 
what exists in the causal order of nature.15 
Naturalism is indeed a philosophical worldview, empirical 
in method, that regards everything that exists or occurs as 
belonging to one all-encompassing system of nature, how­
ever intelligent, spiritual or purposeful nature may appear. 
TIle all-encompassing part of naturalism serves mainly 
negative purposes. It rejects supel1latural things and expla­
nations and Cartesian dualisms that can make the existence 
of the external world a matter of doubt or of God's wilL It 
also rejects arguments from ignorance. Lack of knowledge 
about something never provides sufficient reason for alleg­
ing a non-natural explanation. Moreover, naturalism is not 
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concerned to disprove the existence of God. "Until and 
uIuess the existence of God is shown by empirical evi­
dence," writes Sterling P. Lamprecht in The Metaphysics oj 
Naturalism, lIit is not an article by which human values and 
human ideals may be significantly determined or advanced 
or enforced."16 
It is the task of Philosophy to describe what we have 
to assume in order to do science, namely, that nature is uni­
form, self-contained and law-bound. Science must presup­
pose naturalism for many reasons. For starters, the empiri­
cal nature of science must eliminate supernatural interven­
tions as causal factors. The word IIscience," almost by defi­
nition 
means that principally there are no mysterious in­
calculable forces that corne into play, but rather 
that one can, in principle, master all things by cal­
culation. This means that the world is disen­
chanted. One need no longer have recourse to 
magical means in order to master or implore the 
spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysteri­
ous powers existedP 
Given this worldview, the naturalist is someone who neces­
sarily respects the conclusions of natural science. Both natu­
ralism and the scientific method belong together in theory 
as they exist together in fact. 
Pragmatism is another reason that science presup­
poses naturalism. John Dewey, who grounded his philoso­
phy in Darwin's philosophical and biological naturalism, 
writes that liThe naturalist...sees how anti-naturalism has 
operated to prevent the application of scientific methods in 
the whole field of human and social subject matter.l1lH 
Dewey's defense of natmalism is pragmatic - naturalism is 
pragmatic, anti-naturalism is not. He argues that anti­
naturalism tends to discount the actual resources available 
for the betterment of humanity. The outcome of science un­
der the "handicap" of anti-natmalism is the systematic dis­
regard by anti-naturalists (neo-creos) of scientific method 
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and its consequences.19 The anti-naturalism of the neo-creos 
tends to "dull their sense of the importance of evidence, to 
blunt their sensitivity to the need of accuracy of statement, 
to encourage emotional rhetoric at the expense of analysis 
and discrimination."2o 
Furthermore, the impossibility of a scientific anti­
naturalism is made explicit by Dewey. For IIIf they [anti­
naturalists] presented the naturalistic position in its own 
terms, they would have to take serious account of scientific 
method and its conclusions. But if they should do that, they 
would inevitably be imbued with some of the ideas of the· 
very philosophy they are attacking."21 Dewey is striking a 
Humean note here by pointing out that arguments against 
naturalism are self-defeating. Hume's lesson in An Inquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding is that arguments from 
experience (induction) cannot prove that nature is uniform 
since these arguments are founded on the supposition of 
that uniformity. In other words, to decry science for sup­
posing as its foundation the view that principally only cal­
culable, na~ural forces exist, is to demand that science prove 
what it cannot logically prove, namely, the foundational 
principle by which science is possible. 
III. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN 
Intelligent Design is, in part, an argument from anal­
ogy. Creation science is alleged to be analogous to what ar­
cheologists do when they come across a piece of stone. Cer­
tain shapes of stones and patterns knapped on them indi­
cate the intelligent work of prehistoric man. Archeologists 
infer from an arrowhead or shard of pottery that it was 
made by some prehistoric person, and not by wind, water 
or any other natural force. Indeed, intelligent design is 
something we encounter every day. Entire vocations, like 
archeology, anthropology, cryptography, even insurance 
fraud investigation and the criminal justice system, exist on 
the basis of discriminating design from accident. We com­
monly recognize design in objects or events that are just too 
40 ILYA P. WINHAM 
improbable to have occurred by chance. 
Where the Creation scientists fall into error is in ex­
trapolating this analogy to the world as a whole. It is one 
thing for humans to be able to detect design within the 
world they inhabit and construct. It is quite another for hu­
mans to detect design in the very 111.akeup of the world itself. 
Detecting design as a result of supernatural forces is not 
analogous to detecting design as a result of natural forces. 
We know how human beings design things and what these 
things look like, but we do not know how God designs 
things and what these things would look like. Hume makes 
this point in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Since 
all om' knowledge comes from experience, we can go from 
causes to effects, but only insofar as they are specific causes 
and effects within the world. Hume says that we have no 
idea what it means to say that the whole world is itself an 
effect, and therefore we cannot go from this premise - that 
the world as a whole is an effect - to some alleged cause 
that lies beyond or behind the world.22 
Design reflects more of the maIU1er in which neo­
creos approach the world than of the manner in which the 
world, independent of the human mind, is constituted. 
Neo-Creationists say that they should be taken seriously 
because they do not presuppose anything about the world, 
unlike Darwinists, who view the world through the phi­
losophical lens of naturalism. I need only appeal to Ruse 
and Weber to point up the flaw in their thinking - no 
worldview is free of philosophical presuppositions. Crea­
tionists proceed from the presupposition that "works of 
God exist," and then ask IIHow is their existence detectable 
in the struggle of life?" Neo-Darwinists, on the other hand, 
presuppose that God is absent and unnecessary. They pro­
ceed from the presupposition that "nature is all there iS,ll 
and then ask, "How are favored organisms preserved in the 
struggle for life?" No matter how strong a will, neo­
Creationism necessarily presupposes the possibility that 
God is not absent in the struggle of life and thus nature is 
not uniform or self-contained - even though this is not how 
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neo-creos would see their methodology. This is all one with 
saying that apart from philosophical super-naturalism or 
theism or something of the sort creationism is absurd and 
meaningless. According to Johnson's standards of scientific 
acceptability, then, neo-Creationism should not be taken 
seriously because it presupposes that design exists in na­
ture. 
Arguments from design are also based on Cartesian 
reasoning. Descartes argues in the Meditations that an effect 
carmot contain more perfection than its cause. This argu­
ment translates into the proposition that any design is an 
effect or manifestation of an intelligent cause, a mind. Neo­
Creationists see design in nature and infer causality by 
something with intelligence. This inference, however, is du­
bious. When Creationists purport, to see design or 
"information-rich structures of biologi'23 in nature, there is 
no process of reasoning that can secure them against the 
contrary supposition that the design they perceive is not 
really out there in nature, existing even when unperceived, 
but rather imposed on nature from without. What a Crea­
tionist takes to be a sign of intelligent design, the naturalist 
sees only a product of. nature. John Rowland makes this 
same point by quoting Voltaire, 
who said that it was obvious that the nose was de­
signed to bear spectacles, because it fitted them so 
well. In other words, the evolutionists say that the 
person who sees some sense of design in the eye or 
the ear or any other organ of the living creature, 
sees it because he himself puts it there.24 
In short, design is not a basic h'ait of nature but an illusion 
which nature easily arouses in human beings. 
Finally, a consequence of the different philosophical 
foundations of the theory of evolution on the one hand, and 
of creation science on the other, is that a scientist cam10t 
have an honest conversation with a creationist. What each 
has to say has no persuasive meaning for the other insofar 
--
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as they are not vdlling to question the most basic presuppo­
sitions of their respective positions. This is why the contro­
\'ersv and debate between nee-Creationists and nee­
Darwinists will in all likelihood never be resolved. A Dar­
winist calIDot approve or go along "with those lv-hose beliefs 
"weaken dependence upon the scientific method, As much 
as Phillip Johnson might argue otherwise, the sacred and 
supernatural dimension of life witnessed by neo­
Creationists simply cannot be seen from the perspective of 
the scientific attitude. 
In conclusion, arguing that evolutionary science is 
merely a philosophy is utter nonsense. The attempt to sepa­
rate scientific claims from philosophical claims is na'ive be­
cause science has to make philosophical assumptions in or­
der to 'work, as do we in order to live an orderly life. The 
philosophical assumptions of science are neither ilTational 
nor prejudiciaL Rather, naturalistic assumptions and expla­
nations are necessary for doing science. In other words, phi­
losophy is what makes science as a vocation possible and 
its applications useful and meaningful (pragmatic). We can­
not believe the nee-creos when they maintain that they 
have observed the data objectively, that evolution cannot 
explain what they observe, and that, therefore, a supernatu­
ral intelligent designer is involved by default. Creation sci­
ence and the theory of evolution both presuppose philoso­
phical, methodological, and metaphysical views. The differ­
ence is that the presuppositions of the theory of evolution 
are continuous with science, while those of Creation science 
are not. 
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